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Resumen 
El artículo que se presenta tiene un doble objetivo. Por un lado, pretende analizar 
cuáles son las relaciones entre argumentación y educación, poniendo énfasis en las 
dificultades para definir en qué consisten las competencias argumentativas y en los 
debates que esta indefinición ocasiona. Estas dificultades se relacionan con los modelos 
normativos de pensamiento que subyacen más o menos explícitamente a los modelos de 
argumentación y, al mismo tiempo, se reflejan en los modelos educativos que quieren 
formar a los estudiantes en las competencias argumentativas o que analizan las 
habilidades de estos estudiantes. Por otro lado, en este artículo se presentan y comentan 
los aspectos comunes y diferenciadores de los artículos seleccionados en la 
convocatoria “Argumentación y Educación” y que constituyen este número de la 
revista.  
 
Palabras clave: competencia argumentativa, modelos de análisis de la argumentación, 
teorías sobre argumentación 
 
Abstract 
The objective of the present article is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze 
the relationship between argumentation and education with a special emphasis on the 
difficulties that occur when defining and assessing argumentative skills. These 
difficulties are related to the thinking patterns underlying the argumentation models and 
at the same time, are reflected in the educational models used to train and to assess 
students’ argumentative skills. On the other hand, this article presents and discusses 
common and distinctive aspects of the papers selected for this monograph. 
 
Keywords: argumentative competence, argumentation models of analysis, 
argumentation theories 
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Concern over how we argue and the role of education in the development of 
argumentative skills has an undoubtedly long history. These skills have classically been 
considered to be very complex (Bloom, 1965; Krathwohl, 2002) and are in close 
relation to critical thinking (Erduran & Garcia-Mila, 2015; Walton, 2000). Nevertheless, 
interest in this subject has increased in recent years due to a set of factors encompassing 
the needs brought about by a knowledge society, as well as by international assessments 
on the performance of students from different educational levels, and the development 
of psychological and educational theories regarding argumentation. Many of the 
analyses revealed the difficulties that students of different ages and educational levels 
had when arguing in accordance with criteria evaluated by experts, which in turn led to 
greater emphasis on teaching these competencies (European Union, 2006).    
This concern influenced the development of a large amount of studies that 
evaluated students' abilities to argue, in addition to testing different teaching methods 
aimed at improving argumentation. An example of this can be found in this very issue, 
in which all the empirical articles address one of these two aspects or a combination of 
the two. Nevertheless, despite the effort made, there does not seem to be a clear and 
unified definition over what skills and knowledge are involved in argumentation, or 
over what the criteria are for deciding what it means to argue well or in an adequate 
manner. Expressed in other words, within the educational setting there is no clear 
criterion regarding the meaning of "argumentative competence" (Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, 
& Gilabert, 2013; Trapp, Yingling, & Wanner, 1987), which influences the lack of 
consensus over what should be evaluated in the students' arguments, how what they 
have learned can be analyzed, or how argumentation should be taught. 
According to different authors (e.g., Hornikx & Hahn, 2012; Rapanta, et al., 2013; 
Uhn & Oaksford, 2012), this lack of consensus may be determined by the fact that 
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extremely diverse theoretical disciplines converge in the analysis of argumentation. 
These disciplines include scientific thought, law, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, 
education, and recently, artificial intelligence. Each one of these has contributed its own 
criteria and rules for judging argumentative quality. Without entering going into a 
discussion over the proposals provided by each one of these disciplines, which would 
undoubtedly be very interesting but would clearly exceed the scope of our study, the 
presence of different criteria implies two aspects that color a large portion of the studies 
concerning argumentation. The first aspect is related to discussion over the origin and 
scope of this competence, or in other words, whether or not it is a general competence. 
The second aspect references the existence of a set of norms or rules, related to the 
disciplines, which allows us to discern between what constitutes a good and a bad 
argumentation. Argumentation quality is therefore evaluated according to the presence 
or absence of certain formal characteristics. In the following pages we will analyze 
some of these normative models, focusing on those that have had the most influence on 
education. 
 
Arguing, thinking, and reasoning 
Argumentation is fundamentally a rational judgment in that it reveals, typically 
verbally and in social contexts, the reasons leading to the acceptance or rejection of a 
viewpoint, a set of ideas, or an interpretation (Rapanta, et al., 2013; Uhn & Oaksford, 
2012; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). As Mercier and Sperber (2011) 
affirmedclaimed, it is the human brain's most specific product and best represents our 
reasoning capacity, understanding this as the conscious processes through which we 
arrive at conclusions and support or reject others' conclusions. Reasoning is, according 
to these authors, the competence that allows the human species to go beyond mere 
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perception or instinct. Its principal function is argumentative since it serves to justify 
our ideas and conclusions to ourselves and to others. It would also, out of necessity, 
have a metarepresentational nature.  
Paradoxically, until very recently (yet still not widespread), argumentation had not 
been included among the regular topics in manuals or journals specializing in 
psychology of thought. Nevertheless, according to Hornikx and Hahn (2012), the term 
argumentation can be understood within the psychology of thought in three different 
ways. A classic perspective, stemming from philosophy, considers arguments as a 
reason for any statement that is normally expressed through structured units that have 
premises and a conclusion. The evaluation of arguments is performed from rules of 
logic in the case of tasks with a deductive structure or from probability rules in the case 
of tasks with more inductive structures. Most of the tasks that have been used for 
analyzing reasoning could be thought of as arguments within this perspective, even 
though they have normally been addressed from interests that are far removed from the 
analysis of arguments and closer to the study of the implicit rules of reasoning (Mercier 
& Sperber, 2011). From a second perspective, following the classic study from Toulmin 
(1958), argumentative competence can be understood as the ability to integrate different 
information evidence within a structure that enables the justification of a claim, taking 
into account whether the information is backed-up by principles or more general claims, 
as well as possible limitations and their  possible way of counterargumentsing .these 
limitations  .   Therefore, a good argument relies on a statement, the presence of 
evidence that justifies it, the explicitation of data that limits objects it, and of other data 
that enables those limitations objections to be overcome. This approach has a more 
dialectical character than the previous one in that it not only studies the validity of the 
connections among premises, but also their function. The studies presented by Garcia-
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Mila, Pérez-Echeverría, Postigo, Martí, Villarroel and Gabucio (2016), and Malpique 
and Veiga-Simao (2016), and part of the proposal from Rapanta and Walton (2016), in 
this issue, as well as many of the analyses on scientific argumentation in educational 
contexts could be included within this approach.   
These two ways of understanding argumentation therefore emphasize the structure of 
the arguments, either from the viewpoint of coherence among the different pieces of 
information and the conclusion (the approaches closest to formal logic) or else from the 
perspective of the dialectical use of this information. They also give rise to normative 
theoretical models that are used to describe and evaluate the quality of the 
argumentations. Research included within the Pragma-dialectical approach additionally 
seeks the creation of an ideal normative model that serves to analyze the quality of the 
arguments. Nonetheless, this ideal model is mainly based on the dialogical rules that 
influence an argument's relevance (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). PreciselyIn 
fact, the third meaning of argumentation proposed by Hornickx and Hahn (2012) 
alludes to it being a dialogical activity that is produced in social exchange situations. 
The analyses on the influencing factors in persuasion are also found within this tradition 
(for example, see Chinn & Anderson, 1988), and consequently, have evaluated aspects 
such as confidence or plausibility of arguments, etc. On the other hand, Walton (1996) 
proposed paraschemas as the instrument for describing everyday reasoning patterns 
found in critical discussions. The studies presented by Kuhn, Hemberger, and Kait 
(2016) in the Prospectivas section, as well as the study from González-Lamas, 
[n1]Cuevas, and Mateos (2016) and from Cano and Castelló (2016) in this issue all fall 
within this perspective, along with some of the aspects from Rapanta and Walton's 
(2016) article. 
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According to Mercier (2013) these three traditions have mainly been 
dedicatedfocussed onto evaluation, omitting the study of the processes through which 
an argument is constructed or modified in order to make it more or less convincing or 
more or less relevant (Gabucio, 2002). In our opinion, this supposed "omission" exists 
because the two first positions described by Hornickx and Hahns (2012), closest to logic 
and reasoning, assumed the Aristotelian presupposition assumption that man is a 
rational animal who is characterized by the presence of a set of logical competences that 
serve both to describe or explain our way of arguing and to evaluate it. Therefore, our 
capacity to produce or evaluate arguments would be based on the application of these 
rules to different contents, contexts, and situations. From this point of view, 
argumentative competences would have a general and universal character, inasmuch as 
they are unique to the human species and they also apply to any type of situation, 
although there could be performance factors that influence the quality of the results. 
This point of view contrasts with results found in educational contexts where clear 
difficulties are shown in the teaching and learning of argumentation, as well as in the 
analysis of reasoning. We will not enter get into the discussions concerning logicism 
within the field of psychology at this time (for example, see Cohen, 1981). We only 
wish to stress that the experimental results indicated that the biases, fallacies, and 
limitations in the form of producing, understanding, or resolving problems with logical 
structures were more common than the usetilization of the norms. Similar results were 
produced in probability tasks that also cast doubt on the so-called "Bayesian reasoning" 
(Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2007) and attempted to 
explain argumentation as an application of Bayes' theorem (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 
2012). 
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In order to explain these results some authors adopted the idea of "Informal 
Logic" (Johnson & Blair, 1977), which in addition to deductive or inductive reasoning, 
includes plausible or abductive arguments (Peirce, 1931/1935; Walton, 1987; 1989). 
Abductive reasoning has been identified with reasoning and everyday argumentation, 
which requires different rules than academic or scientific argumentation. This approach, 
therefore, differentiates between forms of reasoning and arguing and additionally 
contemplates the possibility of learning to argue in a complex way. Furthermore, it casts 
doubt on the universality of the rules of logic and reasoning, as well as the equivalence 
among these norms and mental rules employed for resolving tasks. Nevertheless, the 
quality, and even the validity of informal logic, continues to be debated in many forums 
since they depend on criteria that are not always agreed upon. 
Thus, the general logic approach precludes explaining some of the difficulties in 
resolving argumentative tasks, which may possibly be better justified from the 
dialogical perspective described by Hornickx and Hahns (2012). Understanding 
argumentation and its origin as the result of dialogical situations produced in 
communicative environments helps to differentiate between different contexts, with 
diverse demands and meanings, without the need to appeal to logical thought structures. 
Argumentation would therefore have its origin in the communicative exchanges that are 
produced in different more or less formal situations (see, among many other authors, 
Kuhn 1991; 1992; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber, 2000). These type of theories 
would be closer to to the position sustained by Johnson-Laird’s position (1994) who, in 
line with Bartlett's schema theory (1958), claimed that thought consisted of a set of 
skills that unfolded as comprehension of discourse developed and therefore, 
differentiated between types of discourse, as well as the role that context and content 
played in these. Everyday contexts are different than academic or scientific contexts 
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both in the discursive models used and the subjects that are discussed, or the need to 
justify the statements expressed. In short, formal academic or scientific argumentation 
requires structures that are closer to the norms proposed by the approaches more closely 
relatedcloser to logic or to the dialectics that we described above. However, those norms 
are typically used in everyday discursive situations and contexts in which argumentation 
methods would be initially learned (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
These positions additionally explain why in some situations, but not in others 
logical and probabilistic arguments are used that are not used in others. For example, 
Mercier and Sperber (2011) stated that a large portion of failure in logical and 
probabilistic arguments was due to the tasks used for the evaluation being 
decontextualized problems in which the argumentative situation was not clear, their 
objective did not make sense to the arguer, and their content was irrelevant. In other 
words, neither the argumentative context nor the communicative objectives were clear. 
Changing this situation in such a way that the logical relationships or the rules of 
probability are relevant for constructing or evaluating an argument, causes the number 
of errors committed (from the viewpoint of probabilistic or logical norms) to normally 
decrease, which shows that the rules are subject to the task's contextual meaning. A 
second aspect that, to our understanding, is related to this point concerns content. When 
we construct or evaluate an argument we are availing ourselves of a set of claims, ideas, 
or beliefs that are frequently constructed with little or no reflection over the workings of 
theon how the world works (see Pozo, 2014). It is not enough that the argument 
responds to certain norms or that it hasve a certain structure. It must also be relevant and 
meaningful to these beliefs or at the very least, it must relate to them in such a way that 
it may be used for questioning them. It is only in this way that we are able to conceive 
argumentation as simultaneously being a result of learning and as able to promote 
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changes or lessons when it is used to this end in educational contexts (Jiménez-
Aleixandre, Bugallo-Rodriguez, & Duschl, 2000).  
The analyses and judgments over students' argumentative competences generally 
reveal more of what the students are lacking than their skills. Nevertheless, several 
studies have shown that very young children are capable of arguing, especially when 
they wish to fulfill their desires or hungers (e.g., Stein & Miller, 2003). Most of us are 
also capable of passionately arguing our ideas regarding municipal elections, the 
political changes in Europe after the economic crisis, or characteristics that make our 
soccer team so desirable. However, neither these skills nor this passion seems to be 
enough for arguing in academic contexts, especially from secondary education on, when 
the contents of different programs become more complex,  or removed, or even oppose, 
our implicit claims (Chinn & Brewer, 2001). The impression is given that just as 
comprehension understanding of the academic claims and concepts requires a 
conceptual change, the ways to argue these claims require an important change aimed at 
analyzing, evaluating, refutingcounterarguing, or confirming our positions in a manner 
that is more in line with academic discourse.  
 
Learning to argue and arguing to learn 
According to von Aufschnaiter, Erduran, Osborne, and Simon (2008), there are 
two broad lines that relate argumentation and learning. The first line is relatedrefers to 
"learning to argue" and departs from (as we are about to see) the idea that argumentative 
skill developed in everyday contexts not beingis not sufficient for successfully dealing 
with academic tasks. Therefore, it would seem necessary to teach arguing so that 
argumentation could be used as a learning tool (e.g., Kelly, Drucker, & Chen, 1998; 
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Osborne, Erduran, & Simon, 2004) and could contribute to the development of 
academic reasoning and critical thinking (Erduran & Garcia-Mila, 2015; Kuhn, 1999, 
2005; Kuhn & Crowell, 2011). 
The second line, "argue to learn", departs from the socio-constructivist principal 
principle (Vygotsky, 1978) of Socratic argumentative dialogue providing an ideal 
context for knowledge construction. This principle has been confirmed on numerous 
occasions in studies in the area of science educationlearning in the science fields (e.g., 
Bell & Linn, 2000; Felton, Garcia-Mila & Gilabert, 2009; Jiménez-Aleixandre & 
Pereiro-Muñoz, 2002; Kuhn & Usell, 2007; Nussbaum& Sinatra, 2003; Osborne 
&Patterson, 2011; Zohar & Nemet, 2002), epistemic writing (Cano & Castelló, 2011), 
and in the studies of CSCL (Computer supported Collaborative Learning the area of 
collaborative work mediated by a computer (Andriessen, Baker & Suthers, 2003).  
In the following pages we will especially focus on how to teach arguing given that 
thea large number portion of the articles comprising this issue have been 
dedicateddevoted to this perspective (Cano & Castello, 2016; González-Lamas, et 
al.2016; Kuhn et al., 2016). 
Analysis and evaluation of argumentation 
One of the difficulties in studying the students' argumentation forms or in 
developing programs to teach students to argue is that, as we mentioned previously, it is 
not at all clear what argumentative competences in education consist of. The definition 
of these competences seem to depends on the perspectives assumed (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002),  and some of these which are imported 
from contexts that are different from those of argumentation itself (Leitao, 2001). The 
impression given is that most of the analyses depart from a previous definition based on 
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disciplinary criteria (e.g., scientific thought) or of another type (e.g., formal criteria 
concerning good argumentation structure) whose presence or absence determines the 
competence evaluation (Johnson, 2000). Erduran, Ozdem, and Park (2015) performed a 
Thus, the meta-analysis performed by Erduran, Ozdem, and Park (2015) on content 
from journals specialized in the teaching and learning of sciences from the years 1994-
2014. They , showed that most of the empirical research on argumentation and 
education used Toulmin’s (1958) the analytical schema from Toulmin (1958) or else 
Walton’s (1996) or Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004)the dialogical perspective. 
from studies contributed by Walton (1996) or Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004). 
On the other hand, based on the study from Kuhn (1999), the review performed by 
Rapanta, et al. (2013) proposed three different dimensions of these formal criteria for 
evaluating argumentative competence in the educational environment. The first, 
metacognitive, has an impact on the knowledge necessary for constructing quality 
arguments. It differentiates between knowledge regarding the construction of arguments 
(the connections between premises and the information that supports them), knowledge 
on the relevance of content that determines conceptual quality and over argumentative 
schemas (Walton, 1996), or the rigor of the evidence (Kuhn, 1991) that influences 
epistemic quality. The studies presented in this issue by Malpique and Veiga (2016) or 
by González-Lamas, Cuevas, and Mateos (2016) will be insertedbelong to within this 
tradition dimension since the first analyzes the relationship between knowledge on the 
necessary structure of an argument and the production of written arguments and the 
second studies how instruction over these structures influences written production. 
The second dimension, meta-strategic, refers to what the most appropriate 
strategy is for argumentative objectives. Along this line, some studies have analyzed the 
presence of specific discursive elements such as those proposed by Toulmin (1958) 
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(statements, supporting data, rebuttals, etc.), whereas others have looked at whether the 
dialogical aspects proposed by Walton (1989) were taken into account to achieve the 
support of others regarding the argument raised and, therefore, diminishing the strength 
of others' arguments (see, for example, the studies from Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel, 
& Gilabert, 2015; Felton & Kuhn, 2001). The study presented by Cano and Castelló 
(2016) in this issue is in line with this second dimension, given that it analyzes how the 
task's demand favors a meta-strategic use of resources.  
Finally, the third dimension, epistemological, draws on the analysis of criteria 
concerning argument relevance, adequacy of information for the discussion, and 
acceptability of the premises for the critical community participating in the argument. 
The review from Rapanta, et al. (2013) indicated that this dimension was utilized the 
least used in studies on argumentation and education.  
According to Rapanta, et al. (2013), relationships between the type of schema 
used for analyzing the argument and the evaluation criteria have been observed. For 
example, the analytical schema chosen dependeding on the proposed task's format of the 
task (oral or written), one analytical schema or another would be used. However, 
Toulmin's schema (1958) predominated in tasks where an argumentative textask was 
requested, with the focus placed on the form of the argument, whereas in dialogical 
tasks with such as group debates, Felton and Kuhn’s (2001)the analytical schema on 
discourse strategy from Felton and Kuhn over discursive strategy predominated. When 
the task combined both formats, most of the studies used criteria that included the 
analysis of the argument's structure, oral and written dialogical schemas, and discursive 
acts in oral dialogue.  In a similar mannerSimilarly, William (2010) claimed that a 
relationship did exist between items that served to evaluate a certain academic 
competence and the author’s conception of it that came from the item's author..    
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None of the approaches that we described centered around the study of specific 
knowledge on the subject that was being argued. Even though positions were found on 
these effects (Kuhn, 1991, Perkins, Faraday, & Bushey, 1991; Sadler & Fowler, 2006), 
very few studies included these factors, despite the fact that research on thinking,ought,  
learning strategies, or learning to learn seemed to demonstrate the importance of this 
knowledge in the selection of information, decisions over its relevance, or in the 
construction of explanations (see Pozo, 2014). Most of the studies on teaching 
argumentation seemed to depart from the presupposition assumption that it is a general 
competence skill that is transferred from one set of contents to another, without being 
conscious of it. This conception is clearly similar tobuilt on the ideas onconception that 
thought that understand argumentationing ias a general and universal competenceskill 
(Kuhn, 1991; Perkins, et al., 1991). 
In summary, as we have stated several timesmentioned above, there is little 
consensus various positions on the definition of argumentative comppetence exist. 
However, there seems to be a greater consensus regarding how arguing is typically 
commonly performed, at least in thidentifying the e case of structural errors and the 
misconceptions fallacies present in the arguments in which they occur (see the review 
from Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Apparently, differences of opinionthe lack of consensus 
is are not found in the analysis of how we argueargumentation in everyday contexts, but 
in the changes that academic argumentation requires and the way of teaching them. As 
we pointed out in the beginning, the different disciplines place emphasis on diverse 
aspects ofin the evaluation of argumentative quality. Along with numerous studies on 
the effects of expertise in distinct fields (for example, see studies from Ericsson, 
Charners, Feltovich & Hoffman, 2006), oOne possible cause for this resides in the 
assumption that arguing in the fields of chemistry, history, or biology may require both 
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specific knowledge and specific argumentative structures., which would be in keeping 
with numerous studies on the effects of expertise in distinct fields (for example, see 
studies from Ericsson, Charners, Feltovich & Hoffman, 2006). In this respect, it is 
possible that the different analysis criteria for argumentative quality and the programs 
for learning argumentation reflect different discourses, typical specific of each 
discipline. Nevertheless, for this hypothesisto  to be validate this hypothesisd, it would 
be necessary to contrast the presence of differences in argumentation from experts in 
distinct contents or from the same person over contents in which he/she is an expert and 
in which he/she is not. 
 
Argumentation and education: Presentation of the articles  
This issue of the Revista Infancia y Aprendizaje / Journal for the Study of 
Education and Development dedicated to Argumentation and Education, presents five 
empirical articles in addition to the article included in the Prospectuivas section in 
which Kuhn, et al.  (2016) share their view regarding the teaching of argumentation. In 
our opinion, these five articles may be included in any of the traditions of studies 
regarding argumentation and education that we have discussed above and they therefore 
share their virtues and limitations.    
All of the articles in this issue participate more or less explicitly in this double 
twofold idea, mentioned previously, of the use of argumentation favoring learning and 
the development of thinking skills, but also the need of learning teaching argumentation 
or training as necessary for argumentation so that this use may be possible. These 
aspects are very clear in the study presented by Kuhn, et al. (2016) in the Prospectuivas 
section that describes a program for teaching how to argue over the course of several 
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secondary education school years, as in the article from González-Lamas, et al. (2016) 
that compares two styles of teaching, one of them more explicit and declarative, and the 
other based on self-regulation strategies. This duality is also perceived in the research 
from Cano and Castelló’s research (2016) that analyzes the effect produced in 
argumentation when students were given a grid of arguments and counterarguments as a 
model for defending their claim in a well-founded manner. The presentation of this grid 
came before an oral debate, which in turn preceded an argumentative writing task. For 
their part, the participants in the study from Rapanta and Walton (2016) attended a 
seminar on the basic skills of argumentation and also had the aid of an argumentative 
"map" before performing the task. The other two articles focus more on the relationship 
between conditions and learning results. The study from Malpique and Vega-Seimao 
(2016) analyzes the relationship between the students' knowledge of argumentation and 
their argumentative skills, whereas Garcia-Mila, et al. (2016) study the consequences of 
students' academic training in argumentative competence.   
The participants in all of the studies were students inside ofin formal academic 
teaching settings. The studies presented in this issue as well as the remaining studies 
received in the call for papers (minus except for one) analyzed argumentative skills or 
the effects of instruction on junior and senior secondary education, high school, and 
university students. As we discussed previously, this selection of participants was 
related to the fact that academic arguing difficulties reveal themselves beginning in 
secondary education in which there is a qualitative and quantitative leap in the 
conceptual complexity of content and, therefore, students needs more complex 
strategies for addressing this content. Expressed in other words, the skills implicitly 
learned through participation in more or less informal dialogical contexts is not enough 
to account for the activities that formal education requires ion these levels. In addition, 
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other aspects related to the participants were analyzed in these studies, such as the 
influence of the country of origin's culture (Rapanta & Walton, 2016), or the degree of 
general training and academic specialization of their studiesmajor in relation to the 
argumentation's content (Garcia-Mila, et al., 2016).  
Another characteristic common to most of the studies is that the tasks require 
writing as a means of externalizing the argumentation. Even though other argumentative 
forms are studied such as oral discussion or "chats" (Cano & Castelló, 2016; Kuhn, et 
al., 2016), these formats are employed as a means of activatingto activate prior 
knowledge or knowledge of positions that are alternative to one's own, not as the 
fundamental aim of the intervention or the analysis. Both articles also include group 
activities. Although argumentation has a dialogical source and a clearly communicative 
aim in both its origin and its development, most of the academic evaluation activities, 
especially in the stages studied in these articles, are carried out individually and in 
writing, as reflected in the majority of these articles. It should also be taken into account 
that the characteristics themselves of written argumentation themselves enable better 
evaluation of the metacognitive aspects of planning and work task regulation, even 
though other variables (adapting to the audience, etc.) are left out.  
These written works task represent different academic activities that are more or 
less commonplace in classrooms. Thus, for example, González-Lamas, et al. (2016) 
asked their participants to draft argumentative syntheses after reading two texts, Cano 
and Castelló (2016) requested that they express and defend their position on 
controversial issues related to their future position, after watching videos that presented 
different stances, and Garcia-Mila, et al. (2016) required the elaboration of 
argumentative texts from information data provided in tables or graphs. The student was 
given information in these three articles that enabled him/her to justify different 
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opinions, since this information presented problematic aspects in which different 
viewpoints were reflected or information that was not in itself conclusive. In most cases, 
tThe content over what was asked for in the argumentation was not related in most cases 
with the academic activity itself (Kuhn, et al., 2016; González-Lamas, et al. 2016; 
Malpique & Vega-Simao, 2016; Rapanta & Walton, 2016.). The research from Cano and 
Castelló (2016) is an exception. In this case the argumentations wasere centered on 
decisions related to the participants' training or other specific aspects of their domain of 
knowledge. This decoupling of content from the academic activity itself seems to 
support the idea that argumentation is a general competence of general characterskill, as 
well as that the training in this competence can be easily transferred from one content to 
another, as we remarked earlier.  
The manner of evaluating the quality of the arguments clearly varied according 
to each article's aims. The study from González-Lamas, et al. (2016)  presents the 
analysis of the impact from two types of training programs concerning the 
argumentative synthesis of two texts, additionally taking into account the students' 
beliefs regarding textual quality. These changes are evaluated from an analysis of the 
textual structure, the relevance of the information gathered, and the presence of the 
information in the two texts. For its part, the study from by Cano and Castelló (2016), 
related to the training of Special Education and Speech Therapy teachers, inquires into 
how the students select the information and the relevance of such, in addition to how 
they create arguments and integrate them into the general structure of the text. The other 
three empirical articles in this issue study the structure of argumentation from Walton's 
(1996) paraschema theory (Rapanta & Walton, 2016), Toulmin's (1958) theory, and the 
forms of information  use of evidence (Garcia-Mila, et al., 2016), or the clarity of the 
language (Malpique & Vega-Simao, 2016).  In summary, we can state that theis research 
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in the present issue contributes provides material for reflection onover the subject of 
argumentation, which is of great importance in the field of education. Our desire is that 
this reflection may begin to materialize in the design of educational policies that can 
incorporate ultimately change improvements into the curricular designs for educating 
21st century citizens. 
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